

The Study on the Kosaku Dispute

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1. The Proposal of the Problem and Our Approach

The essence of the kosaku dispute has been long discussed in context of the definition of the character of Japanese capitalism mainly by Marxists. This controversy is concerned about the possibility of the social revolution. If the Japanese capitalism is mature enough, this dispute is a sort of the class struggle between the capital and the labor, which precedes the socialistic revolution. In reverse, if the Japanese capitalism isn't developed highly yet and the feudalistic institution remains still, this dispute is the contradiction that is derived only from this feudalism and it is necessary to perform the complete bourgeois revolution. In such a way of thinking, the definition of the kosaku dispute leads directly to the problem of the necessity of the socialistic revolution. This controversy before the 2nd World War is well known as the mutual criticism between the Koza school and the Rono school, and the main stem of the Japanese Communist Party and its minor branch.

Both sides have the common difficulty. At first, there is the problem of the investigation method. Both researched the agricultural area by the method of the fieldwork. As their conclusion was deduced directly from only several cases, the generality and particularity of their cases was not discriminated efficiently, so that the results of the particular research are defined as the general Japanese capitalism directly. Therefore, if their target cases were different, the another appearance of Japanese Capitalism could be deduced. At second, their analysis had the meaning only inside the category of the Marxism. As all phenomena must be explained in the terms of the Marxism, all situations that Marxism can't explain were ignored. Thus, the positivism of the research became lost. Even "The Thesis on Japan in 1927" of the Comintern committed the same dogmatic failure under the appearance of the positivistic analysis of the kosaku dispute. The data were interpreted from the viewpoint of the Western modern society.

To overcome the difficulties of such an analytic method, this paper makes sure the generality of the analysis by using the statistical method and is free from any dogmatic prejudice. The kosaku dispute will be revealed to change in accordance only to the certain factor regularly. Then, the regularity deduced from the statistical analysis will be explained in terms of the motivation. The reason why such a regularity exists will be revealed in the viewpoint of the subjective motive of the kosaku. The kosaku dispute will be understood only after this explanation is given.


2. The Regularity

At first, we propose the significant interrelationship about the participants of the kosaku dispute. We are ready to propose two fitting models. One is the relationship between the number of the kosaku and the participants, while another is the relationship between the nominal price of the rice and the participants. The number of kosaku and the rice price is the independent variant, while the participants are the coordinate one. After these analyses are more investigated, the common regularity will be deduced as the general rule.

1) Does the number determine the scale?

As long as the statistics is permitted,¹⁾ the relationship between the number of the kosaku and the participants of the kosaku dispute shown in a scatter plot as the figure 1.

Figure 1 The kosaku household and the participants²⁾



This figure seems to show that the more the number of kosaku increases, the more the participants are, and vice versa. The observation in 1920 is excluded. It is exceptional because of certain reason. This relationship seems too clear to contradict. The participants are supposed to depend on the number of the kosaku.

However, this hypothesis face the serious crisis, when we explain the motivation of kosaku in the kosaku dispute. Why does the kosaku dispute have happened? It is because the kosaku fee is too expensive for the

¹⁾ See Table 1.

²⁾ $\text{participants (1,000)} = -1984.779 + 0.0013963 \text{ kosaku}$


F Ratio = 26.9062. Prob > F is <.0001. It suggests that both has the strong relationship.

kosaku or because the kosaku income is too cheap. The small number of kosaku household means that the kosaku contracts decrease because of the expensive fee or the cheap income. Naturally few contracts makes the participants of the kosaku dispute less. By now, there is no problem. Then, what has happened when the kosaku income is higher as well as its fee? The number of kosaku household increases and the participants of the kosaku dispute, although they agree the kosaku contract. In other words, they know the kosaku income grows up and at the same time the kosaku fee before they contract. The reason is that the fee and income are measured by the amount of the rice. When the rice price is up, the income increases as well as the fee. Thus the explanation of the kosaku dispute is too hard to make. Even if it is possible to explain that the fewer contracts make the participants fewer, it is impossible to explain the more contracts make them more. Such an assumptive strong relationship is called as superficial. The conclusion is that the number of the kosaku household doesn't determine the scale of the kosaku dispute.

2) Does the price of rice determine the scale?

The following figure shows the relationship between the rice price and the participants of the kosaku dispute.

Figure 2 The rice price and participants (1921-38)³⁾⁴⁾




³⁾ See Table 2.

⁴⁾ participants (1,000) = 10.916267 + 3.940935 price of rice
 F Ratio = 9.0287. Prob > F is 0.0084. Less than 1% is regarded as significant.

It is also significant as well as the Figure 1. In this case, there are three exceptions, 1920, 1939 and 1940. Also 1920 is exceptional in previous case, but the latter adds two tailing cases, 1939 and 1940. Excluding the lower-right three observations, this plot shows the significant relationship between the rice price and the participants of the dispute. This relation is proportional; the more the price is expensive, the more the participants are. Three excluded observations are the particular exceptions when it is the regularity. As seen in the statistical analysis of the Japanese household before, the kosaku (including the jikosaku) dispute has irregularity after 1938. It is the case in this analysis. The exception of 1920 is caused by the 'Holding Off Selling the Rice' of the Imperial Agricultural Association (IAA). To rise the market price of the rice, IAA tried to hold off selling the rice with all the producers. It made the kosaku and jikosaku combined with the jinushi to attain the same purpose. Therefore, the kosaku dispute became less than expected in this year.

When we adapt this regularity as the truly significant, does there remain questions? Why does the Figure 1 show such an strongly significant relationship? As shown at other paper, the kosaku household depends on the rice price as the Figure 3 designates.

Figure 3 The kosaku and the rice price (1921-1937)³⁾



Summing up shortly, the kosaku household is dependent to the price and the participants are proportional to the price. Therefore, the participants seems dependent to the kosaku household. It is the reason to judge that the relationship between the kosaku household and the participants is superficial.

³⁾ $\text{kosaku} = 1443874.1 + 2444.2664 \text{ price of rice}$
 F Ratio = 14.3528. Prob > F is 0.0016.

3. The Interpretation

This chapter explains the general regularity as found in the chapter 2 in the viewpoint of the motivation. It clarifies the subjective reasoning why the kosaku and jikosaku participate the kosaku dispute in accordance to the change of the rice price.

The aim of the kosaku dispute is the decrease of the kosaku fee. The common sense to make the kosaku and jikosaku feel it too expensive causes it. The kosaku dispute derives from this sense of the norm. It seems so natural for the kosaku and jikosaku to feel unacceptable for the balance of the fee and income. As the kosaku fee is the constant amount of rice, the higher the price of the rice becomes, the more the kosaku fee also becomes expensive. However, it means that the income of the kosaku and jikosaku increases more in proportion to the fee. If the revenue is twice as much and the fee is twice at the same time, the ratio of expense remains still, although the scale of the dispute becomes twice. The simple rise of the fee can't explain the motivation of the dispute by this reason. The structure of the expense of the kosaku and jikosaku isn't appropriate to explain the motivation.

Then, let's consider the motivation in terms of the structure of the revenue of the jinushi to receive the kosaku fee. As the main revenue of the jinushi is only this fee, the rising price of the rice means the increase of the income as well as the kosaku and jikosaku. Their expense is only the constant duty, which is not accumulative, while the kosaku and jikosaku need the variable cost for the cultivation and workers. Their net benefit, therefore, is the difference between the collected fee and the duty. When the cost is the constant, the increase of the income leads directly to the one of the benefit. The increasing part of the rising price of the rice means the increase of the benefit directly for the jinushi. Supposed that the income of the jinushi is 1,000 yen and 2,000 yen, and that the constant duty is 500 yen. When the income is 1,000, their net benefit is 500, while it is 1,500 when the revenue is 2,000. It is three times as much. In the case of the kosaku and jikosaku, as the cost is variable, the net benefit remains twice as much in proportion to the price of the rice. Therefore, the rising price of the rice makes the unexpected difference between the net benefit of the jinushi and one of the kosaku and jikosaku because the structure of the structure of the expense is extraordinarily different. It is the reason that the kosaku and jikosaku feel the fee to be too expensive and the scale of the dispute is proportional to the price of the rice. In reverse, the same structure can explain the reason why the scale of the dispute becomes smaller at the declining price of the rise. When the fee becomes half as much, the benefit becomes only the proportional

declination for the kosaku and jikosaku, while the life of the jinushi is critical because the revenue might be less than the constant duty. It was the phenomenon at the period of the Great Depression. The kosaku and jikosaku didn't feel this fee too expensive because its collector was suffered. Thus, the scale of the dispute decreased remarkably at this period.

4. Conclusion

As seen above, we proved that there was the regular relationship between the nominal price of the rice and the participants at the kosaku dispute in means of the statistical analysis at first, and we interpreted this regularity in terms of the individual motivation. It enabled to understand the kosaku dispute to consider the structure of the revenue and the expense of both sides. The deduced conclusion is that the motivation to cause the dispute was not based on the poverty of the kosaku and jikosaku, but the feeling of the unfairness concerned about the distribution of the kosaku fee. This directive sense of the unfairness was so strong as to abort the contrast that must be the combination of the free will. This sense, however, didn't require aborting even though the kosaku and jikosaku became poor. It means that the problem was not the interest in itself, but the way how it was interpreted in the viewpoint of the directive sense of the rural community and whether the interpreted interest was supposed to be fair or not.

This paper simply won't show how the economy influences on the society generally through the empirical study, but also will propose the analytical framework of the rural community in Japan. It means that the jinushi is completely different from the landowners cited at "The Wealth of Nations" by Adam Smith as well as the Junker of "The Agricultural Problem at the East Elbe River" by Max Weber. The jinushi was unable not only to rise up the kosaku fee at the Great Depression, but also to employ alien workers. The dispute behavior of the kosaku and jikosaku doesn't depend on the domestic economy, but the comparison to the benefit of the jinushi. If there is the stratification between them, the important factor is not the comparison, but the lack of the benefit. Thus, the jinushi as well as the kosaku and jikosaku are a member of the community, the life style of the jinushi still remains the rich peasants. As their interest was partially coincident, the jinushi behaved himself as the representative of the community. It implies why the kosaku dispute isn't the class struggle accompanied with the clear cultural difference.

Tables

Table 1: The Kosaku household and the participants of the kosaku dispute

The number of agricultural households and the participants of the kosaku dispute are conferred from “Nogyo Nenkan (The Agricultural Annual)” published by Teikoku Nou-kai (Imperial Agricultural Association, IAA), reprinted version, 1984, Fuji Shuppan. The data of the participants in 1920-30 are conferred from "Annual in 1932," pp. 378-9 and one in 1931-40 from "Annual in 1043," p. 174. It include the number of jinushi who participates the dispute. Without it, the almost resembling results are deduced.

year	kosaku	participants(1000)
1920	1,557,847	40
1921	1,554,667	180
1922	1,541,279	155
1923	1,535,799	167
1924	1,531,177	138
1925	1,525,656	178
1926	1,508,539	191
1927	1,495,676	115
1928	1,482,856	94
1929	1,478,214	108
1930	1,486,133	72
1931	1,495,310	105
1932	1,498,596	78
1933	1,499,855	62
1934	1,508,319	155
1935	1,518,181	142
1936	1,517,701	100
1937	1,500,994	83
1938	1,462,276	68
1939	1,460,953	35

Table2: The participants and the price of rice

The data of the price of the rice are conferred from 'Noringyo (The Agriculture and Forestry),' Toyo Keizai Shinpo-sha, 1966, pp. 146-7 and pp. 166-8.

year	kosaku	price of rice
1920	1,557,847	37.1
1921	1,554,667	36.6
1922	1,541,279	27.5
1923	1,535,799	31.9
1924	1,531,177	38.7
1925	1,525,656	35.7
1926	1,508,539	33.1
1927	1,495,676	28.4
1928	1,482,856	27.1
1929	1,478,214	26.6
1930	1,486,133	16.7
1931	1,495,310	16.5
1932	1,498,596	20.5
1933	1,499,855	20.2
1934	1,508,319	26.7
1935	1,518,181	28.0
1936	1,517,701	27.7
1937	1,500,994	31.2
1938	1,462,276	33.0
1939	1,460,953	41.7